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ABSTRACT 
There is a well-known debate about the respective roles of geography versus 
institutions in explaining the long-term development of countries. These 
debates have usually been based on cross-country regressions where questions 
about parameter heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity 
cannot easily be controlled for.  The innovation of Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) was to address this last point by using settler mortality as an 
instrument for endogenous institutions and found that this supported their line 
of reasoning. We believe there is value-added to consider this debate at the 
micro level within a country as particularly questions of parameter 
heterogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity are likely to be smaller than 
between countries. Hence, we examine the determinants of economic 
development across villages on the Indonesian Island of Sulawesi and find 
technology adoption to play a crucial role. We show that geography-induced 
migration together with population size foster through their effect on 
institutions technology adoption. 
Keywords 
geography, land rights, migration, technology adoption, agricultural 
development, Indonesia 
JEL Codes  
K11, O12, Q12.
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GEOGRAPHY VS. INSTITUTIONS AT THE VILLAGE 
LEVEL 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The majority of the world’s poor resides in rural areas and derives a significant 
share of their incomes from agriculture.  As has been demonstrated empirically 
many times in the literature, sustainable income growth and poverty reduction 
in rural areas requires improvements in agricultural productivity (e.g. Datt and 
Ravallion, 1996; 2002; Byerlee, Diao and Jackson, 2005; Ravallion and Chen, 
2007; Grimm, Klasen and McKay, 2007; Thurlow and Wobst, 2007). Key to 
such agricultural productivity improvements are improvements in agricultural 
production technologies. Thus the critical question arises what are the key 
drivers of technological change in agriculture.  This is of particular relevance in 
regions where land is still available for conversion to agricultural use, as these 
are typically the areas where individual property rights are absent or not well 
defined which might constrain investments in land improvement and new 
technologies (Besley, 1995; Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder 1995).  This 
situation applies to much of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also significant portions 
of Latin America and Asia where lowland savannahs and forested areas 
continue to represent an internal land frontier that is available for being 
converted to agricultural uses. 
When studying the literature on determinants of agricultural productivity 
growth, several seemingly competing hypotheses are invoked. A first strand of 
the literature argues that geography is the dominant factor in determining 
agricultural productivity, such as climate, topography and soil quality of the 
cultivated land area (see e.g. Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 
1998). A second strand of the literature emphasizes population size and 
density, and associated pressure on land, inducing technological improvements 
or the adoption of new existing technologies (see e.g. Boserup 1981; Kremer, 
1993; Klasen and Nestmann, 2006). A third strand of the literature emphasizes 
the role of endogenous institutional change as critical for improvements in 
agriculture (North, 1987; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).  Within that literature, the 
role of land rights has received particular emphasis (e.g. Besley, 1995; 
Deininger, 2003; Rozelle and Li, 1998). According to this argument, land rights 
                                                 
1 This paper was elaborated within the German-Indonesian collaborative research 
centre referred to as Sonderforschungsbereich 552 (SFB 552) or STORMA (“Stability 
of Rainforest Margins”). The project is carried out by the University of Göttingen in 
Germany, the University of Kassel in Germany, the Agricultural University of Bogor 
in Indonesia and the Tadulako University of Palu in Indonesia. Funding by the 
German Research Foundation (DFG) is greatly acknowledged. The paper benefited 
from comments by Chairil Anwar, Stefan von Cramon Taubadel, Heiko Faust, 
Melanie Grosse, Stefan Schwarze and Walter Zucchini as well as participants at 
conferences and seminars in Maastricht (UNU-MERIT), Göttingen (VfS 
Development Economics), IDS Sussex, Berlin (PEGNet), Yale University, ZEF Bonn 
and ISS The Hague. 
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would provide security to the land owner and constitute collateral for credit. 
Both in turn would have a positive impact on investment in new and more 
productive technologies.2  This literature also suggests that land rights are 
endogenous, responding, among others, to past investment decisions in the 
land, land scarcity, land quality, as well as the differential power of different 
rural groups (e.g. Besley, 1995; Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder, 1995; 
Rozelle and Li, 1998). 
These three strands of the literature have evolved quite independently and 
there are only few studies that explicitly test the relative importance or the 
inter-relationships between these competing hypotheses. 
In this paper, we suggest a theoretical argument which links these three 
potential explanations and then proceed to test these linkages empirically. We 
argue that migration to a land frontier is driven by a favorable geography, and 
that high migration in turn creates land pressure (and possibly also conflict) in 
these areas. Land pressure induces communities to opt for land rights, which in 
turn increase the incentive of farmers to invest in agricultural technology. 
Eventually, agricultural technology enhances agricultural growth and economic 
development. In short, geography-induced institutional change is the core 
element of our argument.  
In this sense, our argument is a “micro version” of the well-known 
“Institutions Hypothesis”, which tries to explain long run differences in 
economic development across countries by lasting differences in the quality of 
endogenously generated institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), 
who are some of the principal advocates of this hypothesis, use this argument 
to explain the differential economic performance of countries.  They argue that 
Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, 
resulting in different institutions across the developing world. In places where 
Europeans faced high mortality rates (i.e. unfavorable geographic conditions), 
they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. In 
places where they faced relatively low mortality rates, they settled and set up 
institutions favorable for individual entrepreneurship. These institutions 
persisted to the present, so the argument, and explain to a large extent 
differences in economic development across countries. 
To test and illustrate our micro version of that theory, we use an original 
village level data set, which was collected in 2001 in 80 villages situated close to 
or in the Lore Lindu National Park on the Indonesian Island of Sulawesi, 
where land at the rainforest margin has been progressively converted to 
agricultural land. Although, the villages we analyze share many common 
features and are spread over a relatively limited area, they also differ 
significantly with respect to their level of well-being, geography, technology 
and institutions. Some of these villages seem to be caught in sort of poverty 
trap, while others developed fast in the past twenty years. Our analysis will 
reveal at least one explanation why this was the case. 
                                                 
2 Deiniger (2003, Chapter 2) provides empirical evidence from around the developing 
world for this hypothesis.  
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The reminder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
develop our theoretical argument. In Section three we present our data and lay 
out our estimation strategy. In Section four we present our results and provide 
many robustness tests. In Section five we draw some policy implications and 
conclude.  
2 A MICRO VERSION OF THE “INSTITUTIONS HYPOTHESIS” 
There is well-known debate about the respective roles of geography versus 
institutions in explaining the long-term development of countries.  While some 
(e.g. Sachs, 2003: Gallup et al., 1998) argue that geographic factors, such as 
location in the tropics, being land-locked and distant from markets, or being 
susceptible to particular diseases have a direct impact on reducing the 
economic potential or regions, the opposing view is that institutions are much 
more important determinants of long-term economic progress (e.g. Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999).  Those in the latter 
camp allow, however, for the fact that institutions have evolved endogenously 
responding to, among other things, geographic conditions.  This is done most 
explicitly in Acemoglu et al. (2001) where geographic conditions, particularly a 
high disease burden, affected European settlement patterns which in turn led 
to extractive institutions in non-settler economies and development-friendly 
institutions in settler economies.  Through historical persistence, these 
institutions still heavily influence the economic fate of nations today. 
These debates have usually been based on cross-country regressions where 
questions about parameter heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity cannot easily be controlled for.  The innovation of Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) was to address this last point by using settler mortality rates as an 
instrument for endogenous institutions and found that this supported their line 
of reasoning. 
We believe there is value-added to consider this debate at the micro level 
within a country as particularly questions of parameter heterogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity are likely to be smaller than between countries.  If 
one additionally is able to address the issue of endogeneity by following the 
empirical methodology suggested by Acemoglu et al (2001), we argue that we 
are able to shed new light on these debates by studying these issues at the 
micro scale where villages (rather than countries) are our units of observation.   
As we are dealing with a rural setting, agricultural growth is the critical 
driver of overall economic growth. Agricultural technology adoption is, in turn, 
widely seen as a major determinant of agricultural growth. In Indonesia for 
instance a growth accounting exercise shows that over the period 1980 to 1998 
11% of the agricultural growth can be attributed to the expansion of irrigated 
land, 20% to the increase in fertilizer use and 10% to the accumulation of 
capital (Mundlak, Larson and Butzer, 2002). All these components involve 
technology adoption. However, the question remains how technology adoption 
arises and how it can be fostered. We argue that institutions more generally, 
and geography-induced land rights in particular play a crucial role. In other 
words, we link the interplay between geography and institutions to economic 
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development. Table 1 shows that economic growth measured (as will be 
outlined below) through the percentage change in the share of houses built 
from stone is significantly higher in villages where geography is more 
favorable, measured alternatively through the frequency of droughts, the share 
of agricultural land on steep slopes and the accessibility by car in 1980. Our 
theory is that this reflects the effect of geography working through migration, 
land rights and technology adoption. More precisely, we argue that migration 
to our region at the rainforest margin is induced by a favorable geography. 
High in-migration in turn creates land pressure (and possibly conflict). Land 
pressure induces communities to opt for land rights, which in turn increase the 
incentive to invest in agricultural technology. Eventually, agricultural 
technology enhances agricultural growth and economic development. Later we 
substantiate this by regressing income growth on technology and instrument 
the latter by geography. But first, we discuss each element of that causal chain 
in more detail.  
TABLE 1 
Reduced form relationship between economic growth and geography 
 Years to last drought Share of agricultural land on steep slopes 
Village accessible  
by car in 1980 
 Less than 
8 years 
8 years 
and more 
0.15 and 
more 
Less than 
0.15 No Yes 
Annual percent-
age change in 
share of houses 
built from stone, 
cement or bricks 
1995-2001 
1.551 2.278 1.071 1.989 0.460 2.667 
p-value (H0: 
difference = 0) 
0.183 0.031 0.000 
 
 
Obviously, land is immobile and labor is mobile. Hence, in an 
environment of scarce and regionally unequally distributed land resources labor 
will move to the localities where land is available and its returns are the highest. 
Land returns depend on many factors, but geographic features such as the 
topography, soil quality, rainfall play without doubt a crucial role. For instance 
fields on steep slopes require much more labor input for the same return than 
flat fields. They are also much more difficult to irrigate. Hence, it is very likely 
that in a highly agrarian economy labor moves, all else equal, to localities where 
the geography is favorable for agriculture.   
Increasing population density may lead to tensions on land and under 
some circumstances even to conflicts providing eventually an incentive for 
villagers to opt for land management institutions and in particular for land 
rights reducing the transactions costs in the land market. “Land rights” can 
take very different forms. Here we mean transfer rights, which may include 
rights to sell, rent, bequeath, pledge, mortgage and gift. Such rights can either 
be based on written certificates or on a generally accepted (but not codified) 
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understanding. They can be enforceable in front of a national court or only 
locally within the village community. They can also be only temporarily if 
attributed by the village leader and if the latter from time to time takes all land 
back and reallocates the plots among households.  
Irrespective of the exact form of the land rights, it can certainly be argued 
that land rights affect positively the propensity to investment in agricultural 
production technologies and capital (e.g. Besley, 1995). This should be the case 
because land rights provide the household with security, i.e. the probability of 
expropriation should decrease with the land rights a household enjoys. In other 
words, the expected returns to investment are higher if land rights exist. 
Another important consequence of land rights is that they facilitate the 
collateralization of land. Hence, the bank (or any other lending institution) will 
charge a lower interest rate and/or make credit available in the first place if 
such collateral is provided. Since farmers tend to equate marginal returns to 
marginal costs, land rights may increase agricultural investment also by this 
channel. Note that this is not only a valid argument for long term investments, 
such as an irrigation system, but also for the use of fertilizer, pesticides and 
improved seeds, given that these inputs can often only be bought if credit is 
available in the pre-harvest period. Finally, land rights reduce the costs of 
trading land. Hence, land rights allow in case of negative income shocks to 
cope more easily by selling parts of the land. Besley (1995) finds evidence for 
all of these channels in rural Ghana, but emphasizes that it is hard to identify 
the dominating factor. Obviously, the importance of the channels may in turn 
depend heavily on the exact design of the land rights. 
In what follows, we test and illustrate this causal chain empirically using 
village level data for Central Sulawesi. Our results provide strong evidence for 
our arguments. That, of course, does not preclude that other transmission 
mechanisms might also be relevant.  But the empirical results are fully 
consistent with the argument we advance here.  
3 DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
3.1 Data  
To test and illustrate our argument we use a village survey which was 
conducted during March to July in 2001 in the Lore Lindu region. This region 
includes the Lore Lindu National Park and the five surrounding sub-districts. 
It is situated south of Palu, the provincial capital of Central Sulawesi. The 
survey is part of an international and interdisciplinary research program known 
as “Stability of Rain Forest Margins” (STORMA) which studies the 
determinants of biodiversity and land use in this region and to determine how 
such biodiversity  can be protected through appropriate socioeconomic 
mechanisms. For the survey 80 of the 119 villages in the region were selected 
using a stratified random sampling method (Zeller, Schwarze and van Rheenen, 
2002) The survey collected data on current population, past and current land 
use, agricultural technologies and technical changes, and infrastructure. 
Additional information on agricultural technology, population and geographic 
 10
features was collected from secondary data and added to the data set by 
Maertens, Zeller and Birner (2006).  
The Lore Lindu region is rural. 87% of the 33,000 households living in the 
region depend economically on agriculture. 15% of the total area—excluding 
the National Park—is used for agricultural production. The rest of the area is 
mainly grasslands and forests. The principal food crop is paddy rice. Important 
cash crops are cocoa and coffee. Households mainly operate as smallholders 
and with very few exceptions there are almost no large plantations in the 
region (see Maertens et al., 2006). Logging is either done informally and has 
then only a marginal importance for the local population or is done formally 
but then by companies from outside the Lore Lindu Region and has again no 
impact on local incomes. 
During the past decades a significant part of the migration has taken place 
from the south and middle-west of Sulawesi to the north-east, in particular to 
the districts of Palolo, Sigi Biromaru and Lore Utara. A smaller part of the 
migration has also taken place within sol called ‘transmigration programs’, 
organized by the government mainly during the 1960s and 1970s. These 
programs resettled people in particular from the islands Java, Bali and Lombok 
in Central-Sulawesi. The places were chosen according to factors such as soil 
fertility and land availability (Faust, Maertens, Weber et al., 2003). Many of 
these migrants have today returned. In our sample three villages benefited 
from such migration during the period 1990-2001. None was affected by these 
programs during the 1980s.  
Land rights became more and more widespread over time in the Lore 
Lindu region. They can have different forms, e.g. be written or only exist 
verbally, but they always emerged from a village-specific process. Consistent 
with our theory one can frequently observe that migrants approach village 
leaders to get for free or to buy some land although land rights are not existent. 
Village leaders give for free or sell land, but then usually locals claim new land 
and this leads to a process where land rights are established and a land market 
emerges. It is important to emphasize that these land rights arise endogenously 
and are not imposed by some higher state authority on the villagers. In some 
villages the village leaders centralize land rights, but in most of the villages 
where land rights exist, these rights are in the hand of individuals villagers. 
Land rights are frequently used as collateral in the study region. 
3.2 Estimation strategy 
First, we show that agricultural technology is an important or even the 
dominant driver of growth. We estimate using ordinary least-squares (OLS) the 
following equation: 
iiii XAY εγαµ +++= ''& ,e (1) 
where the index i stands for the villages. Since the survey does not provide any 
information on income or income growth on the village level, we use the 
percentage of all houses in each village built from stone, bricks or cement. 
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Throughout the Lore Lindu region having a stone house is seen as sign of 
prosperity and wealth and therefore that variable should be a good measure of 
the villager’s long term living standard, Y. Moreover, that information is 
available not only for 2001, but also for 1995, 1990 and 1980 allowing to 
measure growth in living standards over time—possibly even much better as 
retrospective information on income would allow to do. Growth in average 
prosperity of the community is then measured as the average yearly difference 
in the percentage of stone houses (   ).3 As will be shown below, the share of 
stone houses varies significantly in our data set and therefore should contain 
enough information about differences in well-being across villages and over 
time. 
As measures of agricultural technology (A) we use the existence of 
technical or semi-technical irrigation systems as well as the use of fertilizer, 
pesticides, and improved seeds. This information is also available for 1980, 
1990, 1995 and 2001. The vector X stands for additional control variables such 
as land inequality, initial population size, initial education and ethnic diversity.  
If we derived this equation from a Solow-type growth model and used this 
equation to estimate the transition path to the steady state, we would need to 
include initial income to control for conditional convergence.  If we derived 
the equation from a simple endogenous growth framework, we would not 
expect such (conditional) convergence to hold (see below and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004).   
To identify the drivers of technology adoption and to avoid any possible 
problems stemming from reverse causality, omitted variable bias and 
measurement error in Equation (1), we estimate then, in line with our 
arguments made in the previous section, the following set of equations using 
OLS in each time. 
IiIiIiIi XGM υγβλ +++= '' , (2) 
RiRiiRRi XMR υγβλ +++= ' , (3) 
AiAiiAAi XRA υγβλ +++= '  (4) 
Equation (2) estimates the effect of geography (G) on immigration (M). 
As a measure of the geographic features of the villages we use the share of 
agricultural land which is on steep slopes, the year of the last drought as a 
measure of the frequency of droughts and whether the village was accessible by 
car in 1980. This latter variable is not intended to measure infrastructure. It is 
rather included as a measure of geographical remoteness and as a measure of 
geographic traits which make the construction of a road more or less easy.4 
                                                 
3 We use the difference in shares and not in absolute numbers to avoid that the 
variable is biased by population growth. 
4 Given the long time lag of this variable and our observation period on economic 
growth and the significant changes in accessibility over time, this variable should be 
relatively independent from accessibility by car today. 
Y&
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One could argue that the share of agriculture land on steep slopes is not 
relevant as long as the total land size is very large. However, we argue that this 
variable is a good measure of geography, since we look only at agricultural 
land. If enough land in the plain were available villagers would not convert 
land on steep slopes to agricultural land. Immigration is measured as the 
difference of immigrating and emigrating households over a given period 
divided by the number of households in the village at the beginning of that 
period.  
Equation (3) estimates the effect of immigration on the existence of land 
rights (R). Land rights are measured by a dummy variable, which takes the 
value one if in village i people have legal government titles for agricultural land. 
As it is the case of most of the variables we use, this information is again 
available not only for 2001 but also retrospectively for 1980, 1990, 1995 and 
2001, which will allow avoiding any endogeneity problems.  
The last Equation above (4) estimates the effect of land rights on 
technology adoption (A). Again, as measures of agricultural technology (A) we 
use the existence of technical or semi-technical irrigation systems as well as the 
use of fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seeds. 
To show how the different elements of our causal chain fit together and to 
account for the possible endogenity of migration with respect to land rights 
and of land rights with respect to technology we estimate equations (2) to (4) 
also using a three-stage least-squares (3SLS) estimator, where migration is 
instrumented by geography and land rights by geography induced migration. 
After having provided evidence for each transmission channel from 
geography via immigration and land rights to technology and eventually to 
growth, following the empirical strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2001), we then use 
instrumental variables estimation techniques to show that geography-induced 
changes in land rights and thus technology drive rural development. Hence, we 
estimate in two steps the following equations 
  (5) 
  (6) 
To check the robustness of our results, we provide various robustness 
tests and perform the necessary over-identification tests to show the 
reasonableness of our exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction implied 
by our instrumental variable regression is that, conditional on the controls 
included in the regression, villages’ geographic traits — measured through the 
frequency of droughts, the share of agricultural land on steep slopes and the 
accessibility by car in 1980 —have no direct effect on growth today, other than 
their effect through migration, institutional development and technology 
adoption. To provide further evidence for the robustness of our results, we 
also estimate Equations (1) and (6) in levels and log levels and use a Fixed-
Effects estimator where the data allows constructing a short panel. 
AiAiAi GA ωππ ++= 1'0
1
'
0
'' ˆˆˆˆ AiAiiiii GAXAY ππεγαµ +=+++=   with&
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics, 80 villages 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Household’s well-being 
Share of houses built from stone, bricks or cement in the villages 
1980 0.052 (0.105) 
1990 0.121 (0.177) 
1995 0.209 (0.233) 
2001 0.313 (0.303) 
   
Technology adoption 
Villages with semi-technical or technical irrigation system 
1980 0.188 (0.393) 
1990 0.300 (0.461) 
1995 0.338 (0.476) 
2001 0.475 (0.503) 
Villages using fertilizer   
1980 0.400 (0.493) 
1990 0.575 (0.497) 
1995 0.663 (0.476) 
2001 0.738 (0.443) 
Villages using pesticides   
1980 0.450 (0.500) 
1990 0.625 (0.487) 
1995 0.763 (0.428) 
2001 0.950 (0.219) 
Villages using improved seeds  
1980 0.288 (0.455) 
1990 0.413 (0.495) 
1995 0.563 (0.499) 
2001 0.875 (0.333) 
   
Geography 
Share of agricultural land on steep 
slopes in the villages 
0.150 (0.256) 
Number of years to last drought 9.150 (10.493) 
Village accessible by car   
1980 0.588 (0.495) 
1990 0.700 (0.461) 
1995 0.738 (0.443) 
2001 0.763 (0.428) 
Migration 
Net Migration Rate 1980-1990 0.021 (0.129) 
Institutions 
Villages with land rights   
1980 0.088 (0.284) 
1990 0.350 (0.480) 
1995 
2001 
0.400 
0.625 
(0.493) 
(0.487) 
Additional control variables 
Gini of land inequality in 2001 0.347 (0.172) 
Population size   
1980 697.7 (687.7) 
1990 897.6 (815.3) 
1995 998.5 (842.9) 
2001 1116.0 (870.0) 
Village with primary school  
1980 0.850 (0.359) 
1990 0.950 (0.220) 
1995 missing  
2001 0.988 (0.112) 
Number of ethnic groups in village 2.613 (2.071) 
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own computations. 
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Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our 
analysis. As the table shows all our time-varying variables such as technology, 
institutions, and population show a reasonable variation not only across 
villages but also over time, which should facilitate the identification of the 
various transmission channels using appropriate time lags. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Technology and economic development: OLS results 
Table 3 reports OLS regressions of Equation (1), i.e. of absolute annual 
changes in the percentage of houses built from stone, bricks or cement on 
various measures of agricultural technology as well as additional control 
variables.  
Columns (1)–(4) show that all technology variables have a positive and 
highly significant impact on economic performance. Note that technology is 
measured in 1995 and growth over the period 1995 to 2001, i.e. thereby 
reducing the possibility of endogeneity, but in any case IV techniques will be 
used below. If all variables are used together (column (5)), only irrigation and 
fertilizer use come out as significant. This is mainly due to the fact that the use 
of fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds are strongly correlated. Often these 
techniques are even adopted in a sequence, starting with irrigation, followed 
first by fertilizer, second by pesticides and last by improved seeds. In our 
estimations the existence of an irrigation system alone explains 31% in the total 
variance in growth rates. If additional controls are included (columns (6)) the 
regression explains 42% of the total variance in growth. The regressions imply 
that the existence of a technical or semi-technical irrigation system in a village 
increases the subsequent annual change in the share of stone houses by 1.5 
percentage points. Among the control variables only initial population size and 
the number of ethnic groups in the village have a significant impact (column 
(6)). Both enter with a positive sign. The number of ethnic groups might be 
endogenous. However, we tested that possibility by regressing the number of 
ethnic groups on the net migration rate and found no significant impact. Land 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient over those households 
possessing land has no significant impact (this is also the case if the Gini 
coefficient over all households is used). The existence of a primary school in 
1980, which we use as a proxy of educational achievement also has no 
significant impact. We also included the initial share of stone houses to capture 
a ‘conditional convergence’ effect.  When including it in regressions (1)-(4), the 
effect is always positive and sometimes significant, suggesting divergence in 
this very simple model formulation.   
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TABLE 3 
The effect of technology adoption on growth, OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Var. Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1990-2001 
Growth 
1980-2001 
         
Irrigation system  
existing in 1995 
(7): 1990, (8): 1980 
2.179*** 
(0.0.367) 
   1.675*** 
(0.363) 
1.521*** 
(0.392) 
1.414*** 
(0.348) 
1.199*** 
(0.275) 
Use of fertilizer in 1995 
(7): 1990, (8): 1980 
 2.004*** 
(0.380) 
  1.155** 
(0.484) 
   
Use of pesticides in 1995 
(7): 1990, (8): 1980 
  1.581*** 
(0.458) 
 0.337 
(0.485) 
   
Use of improved seeds in 
1995 
(7): 1990, (8): 1980 
   1.360*** 
(0.395) 
0.127 
(0.427) 
   
Land Gini 2001      0.125 (1.001) 1.011 (0.915) 1.731*** 
(0.550) 
Ln pop 1995 
(7): 1990, (8): 1980 
     0.879*** 
(0.272) 
0.592*** 
(0.164) 
0.644*** 
(0.150) 
Prim. school 1980      -0.193 
(0.478) 
-0.132 
(0.455) 
-0.155 
(0.293) 
No. ethnic groups 2001      0.145* 
(0.080) 
0.102 
(0.074) 
0.084* 
(0.045) 
Intercept 1.000*** 
(0.215) 
0.426 
(0.308) 
0.544 
(0.399) 
0.971*** 
(0.298) 
0.084 
(0.338) 
-4.880*** 
(1.754) 
-2.996*** 
(0.990) 
-3.697*** 
(0.882) 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 77 
R2 0.314 0.265 0.134 0.133 0.435 0.424 0.427 0.597 
 
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
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In regressions (5)-(8) where fuller models are tested it is always highly 
insignificant (and usually positive), suggesting no evidence whatsoever for 
conditional convergence.5 Columns (7) and (8) use alternative time spans 
without any significant change regarding the impact of technology, except that 
the coefficient of irrigation is slightly reduced. The R2 in column (8), where we 
look at growth over the entire period 1980 to 2001, increases to almost 60%. 
The results also hold if you use levels instead of growth rates as dependent 
variable and if we estimate the model using a fixed-effect estimator over the 
periods 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2001 (detailed results not presented here). 
TABLE 4 
The effect of geography on net migration, OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var. Net Migr. 
Rate 
1980-1990 
Net Migr. 
Rate 
1980-1990 
Net Migr. 
Rate 
1980-1990 
Net Migr. 
Rate 
1980-1990 
Net Migr. 
Rate 
1980-1990 
      
Share of fields 
on steep slope 
-0.111* 
(0.056) 
  -0.108* 
(0.060) 
-0.122** 
(0.061) 
Years to last 
drought 
 0.002 
(0.001) 
 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Accessible by car 
in 1980 
  0.053* 
(0.030) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.019 
(0.037) 
Land Gini 2001 
 
    0.197** 
(0.091) 
Ln pop 1980 
 
    -0.022 
(0.022) 
Prim. school 1980     -0.032 
(0.046) 
No. ethnic groups 
2001 
    0.005 
(0.007) 
Intercept 0.038** 
(0.017) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.028) 
0.099 
(0.007) 
n 76 76 76 76 76 
R2 0.050 0.020 0.042 0.093 0.171 
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
4.2 The transmission channel from geography to 
technological change 
Table 4 reports OLS regressions of the transmission channel from geography 
on the net migration rate over the period 1980-90 (cf. Equation (2)). All three 
measures, the share of agricultural land on steep slopes, the number of years 
since the last drought and an indicator variable for accessibility by car in 1980, 
all have the expected signs (columns (1)-(3)). Two of them, the share of 
agricultural land on steep slopes and the accessibility by car variable are 
significant at the 10% level. If all three geography variables are used together 
they explain roughly 10% of the total variance in growth rates. If additional 
                                                 
5 The R2 of these models is usually worse than before so that we decided not to show 
the results here; they are available on request.   
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control variables are included the R2 increases to 17%. If for instance, the 
share of agricultural land on steep slopes increases by one percentage point, the 
net migration rate decreases by 0.12 percentage points. Accessibility by car of 
the village in 1980 increases the net migration rate in the subsequent period by 
roughly 2 to 5 percentage points. Among the control variables only land 
inequality has a significant impact. Higher land inequality is associated with 
higher net immigration. Note that inequality describes the distribution in 2001. 
Retrospective information is not available for that variable, and hence the 
direction of causality is not clear here. The literature sometimes suggests that 
higher land inequality is associated with higher out migration (and thus lower 
net in-migration). Note that during the period 1980-90 none of the villages was 
affected by a transmigration program, hence there cannot be a bias arising 
from this side. In sum, Table 3 clearly supports our hypothesis that favorable 
geography attracts immigration and reduces emigration, thus spurring net 
migration. However, the regressions also show that there should be other 
determinants of net migration as well. 
TABLE 5 
The effect of migration on land rights, OLS 
(linear probability model) 
(1) (2) 
Dep. Var. Land rights  
existing 
in 1990 
Land rights 
existing 
in 1990 
Net migration rate  
1980-1990 
0.941** 
(0.423) 
0.865** 
(0.402) 
Land Gini 2001  0.211 
(0.302) 
Land population 1980 
 
 0.282*** 
(0.068) 
Primary school 1980  -0.152 
(0.156) 
No. ethnic groups 2001  -0.014 
(0.024) 
Intercept 0.349** 
(0.055) 
-1.325*** 
(0.416) 
N 76 76 
R2 0.063 0.277 
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
 
 
Table 5 reports OLS regressions of the transmission channel from net 
migration on land rights as specified in Equation (3). Migration is still 
measured over the period 1980-90. The land rights variable takes the value one 
if in village i people had legal government titles for agricultural land in 1990. 
Column (1) shows that migration has a positive and highly significant impact 
on the probability of people having land titles. An increase of the net migration 
rate by ten percentage point increases the probability of land rights by 9.4%. 
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This effect holds if additional control variables are included. Migration alone 
explains 6% of the total variance in land rights. If the vector of control 
variables is included, the R2 increases to 28%. Not also the strong positive 
impact of population size. Thus, it seems likely that immigration together with 
natural population growth (and induced population pressure) creates an 
incentive for people to opt for land rights. This process might be accompanied 
by conflict between native households in the village and migrants or between 
migrants and the government or another public institution. Unfortunately, the 
data set we have has only discrete information on such events, i.e. whether 
such conflicts occurred. It turned out that almost each village has known such 
conflicts (65 out of 80 villages had land conflicts the past five years) and hence, 
we would need data on the intensity of those conflicts to consider them 
appropriately in our causal chain. Here again, it is also possible to estimate our 
model using a Fixed-effects estimator over the periods 1980, 1990, 1995 and 
2001. The coefficient of migration reduces a little bit, but stays positive and 
highly significant providing further evidence for the suggested transmission 
channel. 
TABLE 6 
The effect of land rights on technology adoption, OLS 
(linear probability model) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. 
Irrig.  
system 
existing 
in 1995 
(OLS) 
Use of 
fertilizer 
in 1995 
(OLS) 
Use of 
pesticide 
in 1995 
(OLS) 
Use of 
improved 
seeds in 
1995 
(OLS) 
Irrig. sys-
tem exist-
ing 
in 1995 
(OLS) 
Use of 
fertilizer 
in 1995 
(OLS) 
Land rights exist-
ing in 1990 
0.415*** 
(0.102) 
0.354***
(0.105) 
0.310***
(0.094) 
0.234**
(0.115) 
0.255** 
(0.114) 
0.204* 
(0.113) 
Land Gini 2001     0.165 
(0.292) 
0.629** 
(0.290) 
Ln pop 1980     0.203*** 
(0.074) 
0.182** 
(0.074) 
Prim. school 1980     -0.055 
(0.156) 
-0.077 
(0.154) 
No. ethnic groups 
2001 
    0.026 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
Intercept 0.192*** 
(0.060) 
0.538***
(0.062) 
0.654***
(0.056) 
0.481***
(0.068) 
-1.091 
(0.437) 
-0.745* 
(0.433) 
n 80 80 80 80 77 79 
R2 0.175 0.128 0.121 0.050 0.270 0.280 
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
 
 
Table 6 reports OLS regressions of the transmission channel from land 
rights to agricultural technology. This regression corresponds to Equation (4) 
above. Land rights reflect the status in 1990 and technology use concerns the 
year 1995. Columns (1) – (4) show that land rights have a highly significant and 
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positive impact on each of the four technology variables. The existence of land 
rights alone can explain 18% of the total variance in the availability of irrigation 
systems. If the vector of control variables is added the R2 increases to 27%. 
The coefficient of land rights implies that the existence of land rights increases 
the probability that the village disposes an irrigation system by almost 26%. 
Again the effects do hold if a Fixed-effects estimator is used. 
TABLE 7 
The effect of geography via migration and land rights on technology 
adoption, 3SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. Irrig. system 
existing 
in 1995 
Irrig. system 
existing 
In 1995 
Use of 
fertilizer 
in 1995 
Use of 
fertilizer 
in 1995 
Irrigation (1) – (2) / Fertilizer (3) – (4)   
     
Land rights 1.508** 1.532* 2.307*** 1.184 
existing in 1990 (0.590) (0.872) (0.742) (0.768) 
Land Gini 2001 -0.080 0.008 0.281 0.526 
 (0.390) (0.452) (0.467) (0.415) 
Ln pop 1980 0.091 0.141 -0.073 0.128 
 (0.176) (0.254) (0.217) (0.224) 
Prim. school  0.066 0.047 0.100 -0.004 
1980 (0.194) (0.229) (0.223) (0.212) 
No. ethnic groups  0.025 0.023 0.013 0.004 
2001 (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) 
Intercept -0.868 -1.199 0.031 -0.786 
 (0.865) (1.221) (1.049) (1.083) 
     
Land rights existing in 1990    
    
Net Migr. Rate 2.405** 2.260** 2.028** 2.314** 
1980-1990 (0.982 (1.011) (0.965) (1.016) 
Intercept 0.319*** 0.322*** 0.327*** 0.321*** 
 (0.059 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
     
Net Migr. Rate 1980-1990    
    
Share of fields on  -0.081 -0.117** -0.048 -0.120** 
steep slope (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) (0.053) 
Years to last 0.002* 0.003** 0.001 0.003** 
drought (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) ((0.001) 
Accessible by car 0.055**  0.076***  
in 1980 (0.027)  (0.026)  
Intercept -0.020 0.012 -0.030 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) 
n 76 76 76 76 
     
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. a  
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
 
 
Table 7 shows the results when we estimate our causal chain with the 
three-stage least-squares estimator which can deal with the possible 
endogeneity of migration and land rights in our causal chain.  We use the 
existence of an irrigation system and the use of fertilizer as alternative 
measures of technology adoption. As geographic variables we use alternatively 
all three suggested measures or only two of them excluding the accessibility by 
car variable. Again, all variables of interest, geography, migration and land 
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rights have the expected sign and are highly significant. The effects of 
migration and land rights vary only slightly with the exact specification of 
geography. 
4.3 Technology and economic development: 2SLS results 
The results reported in Tables 4 to 7 support our hypothesis that geography 
determines via migration, population pressure and the creation of land rights 
the adoption of agricultural technologies. Now, we will show that geography-
induced technology determines economic performance, which is the last 
element in our causal chain. Table 8 shows two-stage least square regressions 
(2SLS) of growth on geography-induced technology adoption as specified in 
Equations (5) and (6). Columns (1)-(2) report the results of growth on the 
(lagged) existence of a technical or semi-technical irrigation system, which is 
instrumented by the drought, slope and accessible by car variables. Growth is 
measured over two alternative periods. In both regressions instrumented 
technology has the expected positive sign. The coefficient of irrigation in 
columns (1) and (2) is more than twice as high as the uninstrumented 
coefficient reported in Table 3. For instance, the coefficient in column (1) 
implies that having an irrigation system in the village increases economic 
growth as measured by the absolute change in the share of stone houses by 
roughly 4 percentage points per year. The share of the explained variance in 
growth rates by the models in columns (1) and (2) is more than 50 percent. 
Columns (3) and (4) use fertilizer use as technology variable. Again the 
coefficient has a positive sign, is highly significant and bigger in magnitude as 
the effect measured in Table 3. According to the results, fertilizer use increases 
growth by roughly 2 to 3 percentage points annually. Columns (5) and (6) 
reestimate the models of columns (1) and (2) but using only the frequency of 
droughts and the share of agricultural land on steep slopes variables as 
instruments leaving out the accessibility by car variable. Again the effects of 
irrigation systems and fertilizer use on growth are positive and highly 
significant.  
Wu-Hausman tests show that the assumption the endogeneity of 
technology cannot be rejected in the models estimated in columns (1) to (3), 
and hence IV estimation is indeed required. This is not the case in columns (4) 
to (6). Sargan’s test of overidentifying restrictions shows that the assumption 
of the exogeneity of our instruments can never be rejected. Moreover, 
performing F-tests and using Stock and Yogo’s (2004) critical values we see 
that our instruments are highly relevant at least in columns (3) and (4). In 
columns (5) and (6) the F-statistic is at the lower bound of the critical values. 
In columns (1) and (2) the F-test points to a weak instrument problem.  
All results also hold if instead of the absolute growth of the share of stone 
houses the share itself or the log share is used. Hence, the results in Table 8 
show that geography induced technology is an important driver of economic 
growth. This result coupled with the results obtained in Section 4.2 provides a 
consistent picture regarding the effect of geography via migration, land rights 
and technology to economic growth. We cannot completely rule out a weak 
instrument problem in some of the models presented in Table 8, but at least 
 21
the estimations in column (3) and (4) show that in this case geography is not 
only a valid but also a highly relevant instrument. To further support our 
argument, we now perform further specification tests and discuss the 
robustness of our results with respect to various assumptions we made above. 
TABLE 8 
The effect of technology adoption on growth, 2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1990-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1990-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
       
Second Stage Least Squares 
       
Irrig. system 
existing in 1995 
4.019*** 
(1.266) 
   2.759** 
(1.241) 
 
Irrig. system 
existing in 1990 
 3.715***
(1.372) 
    
Use of fertilizer  
in 1995 
  3.062***
(0.740) 
  3.782** 
(1.898 
Use of fertilizer  
in 1990 
   2.335***
(0.515) 
  
Land Gini 2001 -0.490 
(1.249) 
0.172
(1.154) 
-1.597 
(1.173) 
-0.387
(0.852) 
-0.157 
(1.078) 
-2.108 
(1.769) 
Ln pop 1980 0.153 
(0.443) 
0.553
(0.378) 
0.517
(0.301) 
0.559**
(0.250) 
0.494 
(0.413) 
0.347 
(0.523) 
Prim. school 
1980 
-0.270 
(0.655) 
0.094
(0.608) 
-0.336 
(0.565) 
-0.085
(0.421) 
-0.403 
(0.562) 
-0.252 
(0.650)- 
No. ethnic 
groups 2001 
0.077 
(0.102) 
0.076
(0.094) 
0.148*
(0.085) 
0.154**
(0.064) 
0.106 
(0.088)) 
0.143 
(0.094) 
Intercept -0.382 
(2.478) 
-3.191
(2.158) 
-2.992*
(1.670) 
-3.262**
(1.389) 
-2.163 
(2.285)) 
-2.270 
(2.509) 
n 77 77 77 77 77 77 
R2 0.527 0.568 0.640 0.782 0.656 0.570 
       
First Stage for Technology Adoption 
       
Years to last 
drought  
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.008
(0.005) 
0.005
(0.004) 
0.004
(0.004) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
Share of fields 
on steep slope 
-0.216 
(0.202) 
-0.301 
(0.210) 
0.074
(0.176) 
0.109
(0.158) 
-0.332* 
(0.193) 
-0.244 
(0.194) 
Accessible by 
car in 1980 
0.202* 
(0.121) 
0.165***
(0.126) 
0.553***
(0.105) 
0.601***
(0.000) 
  
R2 0.330 0.233 0.495 0.618 0.303 0.293 
       
Endogeneity and Overidentification Tests 
       
Wu-Hausman 
Test, H0: Re-
gressors ex-
ogenous (p-
values) 
 
0.009 0.008 0.007 0.113 
 
0.271 
 
0.163 
Sargan’s test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions, H0 
excluded in-
struments are 
valid (p-values) 
 
0.183 0.236 0.739 0.637 
 
0.514 
 
0.566 
Stock and 
Yogo‘s F-test 
for first-stage 
regression 
 
3.820 2.750 11.280 15.990 
 
4.230 
 
2.220 
       
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
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TABLE 9 
Specification tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
Growth 
1995-2001 
       
Part A: Second Stage Least Squares 
       
Irrigation 1995 
 
3.963*** 
(1.372) 
5.807**
(2.273) 
1.514 
(1.367) 
   
Fertilizer 1995 
 
   2.947***
0.743 
3.074*** 
(0.788) 
2.044 
(3.511) 
Share of fields 
on steep slope 
-0.088 
(0.873) 
  -0.548
(0.705) 
  
Years to last 
drought 
 -0.040 
(0.036) 
  -0.001 
(0.018) 
 
Accessible by car 
in 1980 
  1.305**
(0.521) 
  0.594 
(2.003) 
       
n 77 77 77 77 77 77 
       
Part B: First Stage for Technology Adoption 
       
Share of fields 
on steep slope 
 -0.216 
(0.202) 
-0.216 
(0.202) 
 0.074 
(0.176) 
0.074 
(0.176) 
Years to last 
drought 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
 0.005 
(0.004) 
Accessible by car 
in 1980 
0.202* 
(0.121) 
0.202* 
(0.121) 
 0.553*** 
(0.105) 
0.553*** 
(0.105) 
 
       
Part C: Second Stage Least Squares without additional geography variable 
       
Irrigation 1995 
 
4.279*** 
(1.385) 
5.933*** 
(2.225) 
2.759** 
(1.241) 
   
Fertilizer 1995 
 
   3.103*** 
(0.745) 
3.046*** 
(0.752) 
3.782** 
(1.884) 
       
Part D: Coefficients in Part A significantly different from coefficients in Part C 
χ2-Test, H0: coef-
ficients not sig-
nificantly different 
(p-values) 
 
0.818 
 
0.702 
 
0.316 
 
0.832 
 
0.970 
 
0.356 
       
Note: * significant with p<10%, ** significant with p< 5%, *** significant with p<1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All regressions include the same control variables as above: Gini coefficient of land 
inequality, the logarithm of population size in 1980, the existence of a primary school in 1980 and the 
number of ethnic groups in the village.  
Source: 2001 STORMA village survey; own estimations. 
4.4 Specification Tests 
First we provide some additional support for the exclusion restriction implied 
by our approach. We show that geography has no direct impact on economic 
performance, and, hence is uncorrelated with the residuals εi in Equation (1), 
but acts only through the hypothesized transmission channel. Table 9 reports 
2SLS regressions of our economic performance variable on technology. We 
use alternative geography variables as instruments for technology and add 
another geography variable as exogenous regressor. If geography had a direct 
effect on economic performance, we would expect this variable to come out as 
significant. We also test whether the 2SLS technology coefficients reported in 
Part A of Table 9 estimated with the instruments indicated in Part B are 
significantly different from the technology coefficient shown in Part C, where 
no additional geography variable is introduced in the model. The test statistics 
in Part D show that for all possible combinations of instruments and 
exogenous regressors our exclusion restriction cannot be rejected. However, 
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for the cases where irrigation and fertilizer use are instrumented with the 
drought and slope variables and accessibility by car is used as exogenous 
variable (columns (3) and (6)) our exclusion restriction is weak. Remember that 
we estimated all models above also without the accessibility by car variable 
using only the two other geography variables. Our results never changed 
substantially. 
One might argue that our accessibility by car variable satisfies not the 
exclusion restriction because building a stone house needs a road. First note 
that we look at changes in the share of stone houses and not only at the level 
of the share. Note also, that our accessibility by car variable concerns the year 
1980 whereas the used growth spells concern the period 1995 to 2001 or 1990 
to 2001. During the eighties and nineties many roads have been built (compare 
Table 2). Hence, accessibility by car in 1980 should be a good proxy of the 
geographic features of the village area and should be uncorrelated with 
infrastructure today. The first roads can be traced back to the colonial period 
and were indeed built where geography made it easy. Roads through rougher 
areas as for example the road to Barisi in the South-East of the Lore-Lindu 
region were built after 1980. In our dataset, accessibility by car in 1980 is 
negatively correlated with our share of agricultural land on steep slopes variable 
(correlation coefficient: -0.25), this also supports the view that this variable is a 
good measure of geography. Moreover, stones and bricks are often made or 
collected in the surroundings of the villages and hence, no road is necessary to 
bring them. Also, heavy materials including stones are in the Lore Lindu region 
traditionally and still frequently transported using buffalos, donkeys, horses or 
motorcycles. Given that labor is very cheap transport time plays no important 
role. In 2001, among the 15 villages without any stone house, 11 are not 
accessible by car and 4 are accessible. Conversely, 8 villages among the 19 
villages which are not accessible by car, have a significant share of stone 
houses. Lastly, note again that as demonstrated all our results also hold if we 
exclude the accessibility by car variables from the set of our geography 
instruments. 
One may also question the exogeneity of our “share of agricultural land on 
steep slopes” variable. One may argue that economic expansion leads to the 
conversion of land which is more difficult to cultivate than existing land. We 
checked this hypothesis by comparing villages where expansion of land was 
still possible in 1990 and 2001 with villages where expansion was still possible 
on 1990 but not in 2001. Obviously, in the latter villages (10 villages) 
conversion has taken place. However, in these villages the share of agricultural 
land on steep slopes was not significantly different from the share observed in 
the other villages. 
Another objection one might have against our argument is that migration 
has a direct (and not indirect) link on technology adoption. Such a link could 
exist if migrants bring new technologies to the villages. For example, there is 
some evidence that Bugalesian migrants are specialist of cultivating coffee. 
While we do not deny this link — in fact it is complementary to our approach 
— we claim that this is not the dominating force. We tested this link also 
empirically by regression technology adoption on the net migration rate. In 
these regressions migration never came out as significant.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
We presented evidence for the impact of agricultural technology such as 
irrigation and the use of fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds on 
agricultural growth. While this result per se is not surprising, our empirical 
analysis is, in contrast to many previous studies, robust to a likely endogeneity 
bias of agricultural technology. But even more importantly, we show in detail 
at least one important channel which drives technology adoption. Our results 
suggest that a favorable geography, such as easily cultivable land and a low 
frequency of droughts attract migration, which in turn creates together with 
natural population growth pressure on land. This provides an incentive for 
villagers and village leaders to opt for land rights which in turn provide an 
incentive to invest in agricultural technology. Land rights facilitate also 
collateralization of land and provide by this channel access to credit which in 
turn can be used to buy productivity increasing inputs such as fertilizer, 
pesticides and improved seeds. Given that we use geography induced 
institutions, similar to the more macroeconomic literature on institutions and 
growth (see Acemoglu et al. 2001) our results are also robust to the possible 
endogeneity of institutions. Institutions could be endogenous in our case, if 
farmers tried to enforce land rights by investing on a piece of land. 
The channel we identify here is similar to the one emphasized by Boserup 
(1981), but extends it in the sense, that we show that the effect from 
population on technology is not direct but acts through its effect on the 
implementation of land rights, which is endogenous in this process. Hence, we 
provide a link between Boserupian theory and the theory of institutional 
change as formulated by North (1987) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985). 
Of course one should be very cautious in deriving a theory from an 
instrument—geography in our case—, but note that our theory is not only 
based on geography-induced technology, but that we empirically trace our 
causal chain from technology via land rights and demographics back to 
geography. Hence, geography is not only instrument but in itself the initial 
driver of development. But given that geography is fixed it is immune to any 
endogeneity problem and can also serve as an instrument for our purpose. 
Our study implies that assisting villages and village leaders to establish 
land rights can foster economic development also in areas which are 
geographically less favored and thus benefit not from “geography induced 
institutions”.6 Put differently, our study nicely shows that institutions foster 
technology and thus growth, but that institutions are endogenous and arise 
only under specific conditions. If these conditions are not given, there is room 
for policy to initiate the process exogenously. 
However, it should be noted that the region analyzed in this paper is a 
rainforest area; therefore immigration-induced deforestation is a potential 
environmental problem and calls even in geographically favored villages for 
alternative ways of enforcing land rights. As suggested by Maertens et al. 
(2006), agricultural intensification leading to improved yields and increased 
                                                 
6 See also Rozelle and Li (1998) on the role of village leaders in land rights in China. 
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labor requirements can help to stabilize the rainforest margin. As in our model 
they see an improvement of the road network as an appropriate driver of such 
intensification. Hence, a positive feed-back loop from externally promoted 
intensification to improved land rights and further technological changes could 
both stabilize the rainforest margin and promote growth of incomes of 
households close to it.   
But it should also not be overseen that land rights might not improve the 
livelihoods of all and, often first of all modify traditional land allocation rules. 
In our study region, it was reported that some villagers behave myopic when 
land markets arise. They sell land to migrants to make fast money. The land is 
usually fallow land, which has been kept, e.g. as reserve for heritage. Later, they 
recognize their mistake, but there is no more free land available. This process 
leads in some villages to a marginalization of local inhabitants relative to 
migrants and also accelerates deforestation (Faust et al., 2003; Weber and 
Faust, 2006).  
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